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Introduction
In the 1980s the Member States of the European Union
were faced with a substantial increase of the inflow of
migrants and refugees which was, to say the least,
perceived1 by policy makers as being a threat to security
and stability. It also increased the belief that this movement
was overloading the capacity of the nation states to
receive immigrants and was, furthermore, responsible
for the emergence of resistance and fear, and even of
xenophobic and racist feelings, among the host populations
forcing the governments to take restrictive legislative and
administrative measures.
Along with this inflow, the number of asylum
applications dramatically increased which led to the
competent authorities being overloaded, to the exhaustion
of resources and to unacceptable backlogs and delays in
the examination of asylum applications. The Member
States individually adopted restrictive measures to deal
with the high volume of applications. In an effort to
reconcile humanitarian concerns with economic and
political imperatives, reform mainly focused on
procedures rather than on substance. The individual
restrictive action, however, was not only revealed to be
insufficient and ineffective but also had immediate
negative effects in neighbouring countries. These
countries, as a consequence, experienced an increase in
the volume of claims they received, which led to a race for
the most restrictive policies with serious results for the
right of asylum. This situation called for a coordinated
response at European Union level. Moreover, the creation
of the single market and the expected abolition of internal
border controls accentuated the need for a common
approach, since it was believed it would facilitate the
intra-community movements of asylum seekers.
This was the context in which the Convention
Determining the State Responsible for Examining the
Applications for Asylum Lodged in one of the then
twelve Member States of the European Communities
(the Dublin Convention) was signed by eleven of the then
twelve Member States at the meeting of the Immigration
Ministers held in Dublin on the 15 June 1990.2 It was the
first legal instrument signed with the purpose of achieving
the free movement of persons, which was imperative for
the establishment of the internal market. The third
paragraph of the preamble of the Convention states that
it is intended as a back-up measure to enable checks on
persons at internal borders to be abolished.
The Dublin Convention was designed to avoid long
delays in the adjudication process and to respond to two
kinds of phenomenon:
• Firstly, the problem of so-called “refugees in orbit”
(refugees that fail to find a state willing to take
responsibility for examining their asylum applications
and are therefore shuffled from country to country in
a constant quest for asylum).
• Secondly, it addresses the problem of multiple asylum
claims, simultaneously or successively lodged in
different Member States by the same alien.3
The Dublin Convention, like the Schengen
Convention’s provisions on asylum, is not aimed at
harmonising substantive or procedural rules of asylum
but rather is limited to fixing uniform criteria for the
allocation of responsibility to one single State for the
examination of an asylum application.4
On 1 September 1997, seven years after its signature,
the Dublin Convention finally entered into force in the
twelve European Union Member States which had
originally signed the instrument.5 In Sweden and Austria,
the Convention entered into force on 1 October 1997 and
in Finland on 1 January 1998. The Dublin Convention
has replaced the Schengen provisions on asylum.6 The
replacement was decided by the Schengen Executive
Committee meeting in Bonn on 26 April 1994, by means
of the so-called Bonn Protocol. In the future, according to
the Amsterdam Treaty, the Dublin Convention will have
to be replaced by a binding Community (“First Pillar”)
instrument, probably a regulation.7This new instrument
is likely to improve both its substance and the involvement
of the European Union institutions.8
The objective of this article is to outline the main aims
and features of the Dublin Convention and to briefly
compare them with the Schengen provisions on asylum.
Secondly, it will report on the experiences of the
Convention’s first year of implementation: the problems
and limitations of the Convention as well as relevant
lessons drawn from the practical application of Schengen.
Thirdly, it will confront the aims with the results so far
and it will comment on necessary future developments.
The Dublin Convention on Asylum: Aims and Features
Why was the Convention signed?
The aim was to establish the principle that one single
Member State is responsible for dealing with an alien’s
(i.e. a national of a third country according to Art. 1 of the
Convention) asylum application, by agreeing that one
Member State only is responsible for handling an asylum
claim made by an individual. By introducing this definite
responsibility of a particular Member State, it avoids the
Dublin after Schengen: Allocating Responsibility for
Examining Asylum Applications in Practice*
Clotilde Marinho and Matti Heinonen
Respectively Lecturer and Finnish Observer, EIPA
__________________
* Un bref résumé de cet article en français figure à la fin.3
situation of refugees in orbit9 and multiple applications of
asylum, a situation which would otherwise have been
facilitated by the creation of the internal market. Moreover,
wasteful duplication of Member States’ resources is
avoided and backlogs and delays in the examination of
asylum procedures are reduced.
WHY?
• Increase of asylum applications/ delays in processing/
exhaustion of resources
• “a space without internal frontiers”
CALLED FOR A COMMON RESPONSE
TO TACKLE
• Intra-Community movements of asylum seekers
determined by the choice of the “best” asylum state
• “Refugees in orbit”
• “Asylum shopping”
How is the responsibility allocated?
The Convention sets out the criteria that determine which
Member State is responsible for examining an asylum
application in a hierarchical order. The first criterion
relates to family reunification10 and meets a concern
expressed by the UNHCR. The State where certain
members of the family of the asylum applicant already
have refugee status is the State responsible, provided that
the persons concerned so desire it. The members of the
family are restricted to the spouse, unmarried children
under eighteen, and the parents of the applicant if he/she
is unmarried and under eighteen. In this respect, the
UNHCR has already called for a wider interpretation of
“family member” in the application of the Convention.
Secondly, the Member State who issued a valid residence
permit11 is responsible. Thirdly, the Member State who
issued a valid visa is the competent authority. The
Convention provides several exceptions and modifications
that might occur in practice, e.g. responsibility in cases
where the applicant is in possession of more than one
residence permit or visa. Fourthly, in cases of illegal
entry,12 the Member State entered is responsible unless
the applicant has been living in the country where he/she
lodged the application for six months. Fifthly, if the alien
entered legally, the Member State responsible for the
control of that entry13 is the one who should examine the
application, unless the application was lodged in another
Member State and in both States the visa obligation is
waived. Finally, in cases where none of the above criteria
applies, the first Member State14 where the application
claim is made is called upon to examine the claim. It is
ensured that applications made at the embassy of a
Member State are deemed to be lodged in that Member
State (if the legislation of the Member State in question
permits an asylum application to be made abroad). The
selection of the criteria does not therefore take into
consideration the choice of the asylum seeker15 but rather
the conditions of his/her access to the European Union
and to some extent the personal conditions of the asylum
seeker.
HOW?
• One single state is responsible for examining an
asylum application
• No harmonisation of substantive and procedural rules
of asylum
• Uniform criteria for the allocation of responsibility
– Family reunification
– Residence permit
– Visa
– Illegal entry
– Control of entry
– Application lodged
BUT
• Opt-out clause
• Humanitarian clause
What does the responsibility imply?
The Member State responsible for examining the
application will process the application in accordance
with national legislation and international obligations.16
As the national laws are not harmonised, this agreement
presupposes mutual confidence in each other’s legislation
and adjudication processes, which relies on the fact that
there is a common framework for the different national
laws constituted by the Geneva Convention as amended
by the New York Protocol. As we will argue later,
although this might be a sound beginning, further
harmonisation on substantive and procedural rules of
asylum have to follow in order to avoid the possibility of
applicants perceiving variability in their chances of success
depending on the country in which they make the
application. Such a perception might encourage them to
apply in the most lenient country.
The rule of exclusive competence is offset by the
sovereign right of a Member State to examine an
application presented by an alien, as long as he/she
agrees, even though it would not be competent according
to the criteria set out in the Convention (the opt-out
clause). Moreover, any Member State can accept the
request of another Member State to examine an application
for humanitarian reasons (the humanitarian clause), again
with the consent of the claimant. In the same way, a
decision to reject an asylum application is not imposed on
other Member States, which are free to examine the
application. Furthermore, as mentioned, the Dublin
Convention does not obviate the right to send an applicant
to a safe third country in accordance with the Geneva
Convention, which means that it should only take place
if it respects the principle of non-refoulement. The concept
of responsibility does not provide the guarantee that the
asylum application will be examined in substance by one
of the Member States, and also does not confer on the
asylum applicant an individual right to a material
examination of his/her application. Therefore both the
Dublin Convention and the Schengen asylum provisions
have limited importance for the protection of asylum
seekers and should be complemented by other instruments
aimed at ensuring access to a fair asylum procedure for
asylum seekers.17
Once the responsibility is allocated there are basically4
three obligations incumbent upon the responsible State.
First of all, they should take charge, that is they should
grant entry to the applicant. Secondly, they should com-
plete the examination of the asylum application. Thirdly,
they should readmit or take back the applicant who is in
another Member State irregularly (pending the examin-
ation of his/her application or after its rejection) or who
has withdrawn his/her application and introduced a new
claim in another Member State. The conditions which
ensure that Member States take charge of and readmit
applicants according to the Convention are quite informal
and flexible. Moreover the delays are relatively short.
What are the practical arrangements set by the
Convention?
In view of its application, the Dublin Convention provides
for mechanisms of exchange of information, both in
terms of general information, e.g. on national legislation
and statistics, and in terms of individual information. It
also set up,  under Art. 18 of the Dublin Convention, a
Committee of Representatives of the Member States to
follow the application of the Convention (Article 18
Committee). This Committee has adopted a series of
guidelines focusing on a number of practical issues, such
as time periods for replying to a request for transfers or re-
admission, the implementation of transfers, use of means
of proof to determine responsibility, etc.18 However, we
will later point to areas in which the adoption of additional
guidelines is needed in order to ensure the efficient
functioning of the Convention.
Did Schengen provide a blueprint for Dublin?
The Schengen provisions on asylum and the Dublin
Convention are inspired by the same philosophy and
have the same goals. Moreover, their specific provisions
are quite similar, although Dublin, is a more refined and
complete instrument. One can still identify some
differences while comparing both Conventions.19
First of all, while the Dublin Convention is applicable
in all 15 EU Member States, the Schengen asylum rules
were applied fully in seven Member States only, namely
Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Spain and
Portugal.20 The EU is currently preparing adequate legal
solutions for extending the Dublin Convention to Norway
and Iceland, who have signed a cooperation agreement
with Schengen. The possibility of concluding a parallel
Convention to the Dublin Convention is under
consideration. Such a parallel Convention is also an
option for other non-EU Member States such as applicant
countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Switzerland.
Other differences are merely differences in wording
which do not seem to lead to different results, e.g. the
definition of an asylum application. Some others have
been overcome in reality, e.g. in Dublin the criteria are
presented in a clear hierarchical order, unlike the Schengen
system, though in practice a similar order was applied in
the Schengen context. Other differences, however, – e.g.
concerning the allocation of responsibility – relate to
aspects which though basically the same could lead to
divergent practical results. More importantly some
differences have an impact on the protection offered to
refugees.
As highlighted previously, the Dublin Convention
distinguishes between the criteria resulting from a valid
residence permit and a valid visa giving priority to the
first, while in the case of Schengen these criteria have
equal weight. Moreover, where an asylum seeker is in
possession of more than one residence permit the Schengen
Agreement establishes that the State that issued the visa
that expires last is responsible. Dublin, however, attributes
the responsibility to the State having issued the residence
permit for the longer period, and only when the period of
validity of the permits is identical is the expiry date taken
into account.
In both Conventions, the State issuing the visa is
released from its responsibility if it has obtained
authorisation from another state, or in the case of a transit
visa, if it has ascertained from the other State that the
applicant fulfilled the conditions for entry into that State.
However, the Dublin Convention specifies that the
authorisation and confirmation have to be written. This
exigency was taken over by the Schengen group initially
but abandoned once their visa policies were harmonised.
Presumably, this will also happen in the context of the
European Union but until harmonisation is achieved the
difference will persist.
For asylum seekers possessing a transit visa, but who
are not required to have a visa for the Member State where
they lodged their asylum application, the provisions in
the two Conventions are different. Within Schengen, the
State first entered is responsible, while within Dublin the
responsibility lies with the State where the application is
submitted. In the framework of Dublin, asylum seekers
belonging to the limited group for whom visa requirements
are waived are therefore free to choose the country in
which they present their asylum application. This makes
it more in tune with UNHCR Conclusion 15 which states
“the intentions of the asylum seeker as regards the country
in which he/she wishes to request asylum should as far as
possible be taken into account”.21
In cases of illegal entry, within Dublin the
responsibility of the State whose external (EU) border
has been crossed ceases if the applicant has been living in
the State where he/she makes his/her application for at
least six months. The right of a State to obviate from the
allocation according to the criteria set are foreseen in both
Conventions, however, under Dublin the wishes of the
applicant have to be respected.22 In conclusion, from a
refugee protection perspective, the provisions of the
Dublin Convention include some important improvements
on the Schengen asylum rules.
These examples confirm that Dublin is not merely a
copy of the asylum chapter of the Schengen imple-
mentation convention.23 Moreover, as a result of the
practical implementation of the Schengen provisions
since March 1995, and due to the decisions adopted to
resolve problems of interpretation and the application of
certain provisions, both conventions have grown even
further apart. To some extent the differences were
overcome by means of decisions on the interpretation of
Dublin and its application. Still actual differences persist
and will be mentioned in the following section as they are5
problems which the Member States will have to cope
with in applying the Dublin Convention, and from which
lessons can be drawn on the Schengen experience.
The Dublin Convention in Practice
This section will try to identify the problems that have
arisen in the implementation of the Dublin Convention
and will explore its shortcomings or limitations. To
ensure an effective and smooth application of the
Convention a number of implementation measures have
been approved by the Council, e.g. a standard form for
determining the Member State responsible for examining
an application for asylum and the general guidelines for
the implementation of the Convention with a common
interpretation of the concepts used in it.24 The Article 18
Committee has adopted texts clarifying the Convention.25
However, the process is still not complete. We will first
outline some of the necessary instruments and guidelines
for the interpretation and application of the Convention
which need to be adopted, developed or complemented to
ensure a smooth application of the Convention, both from
an administrative and a refugee protection point of view.
What further guidelines and instruments are needed?
Eurodac
Eurodac (European Automated Fingerprint Recognition
System) is a system for the collection, storage, exchange
and comparison of fingerprints of asylum applicants.
This computer system allows for the comparison of
asylum seekers’ fingerprints with the aim of determining,
with certainty, the Member State responsible for
examining an asylum request. It aims to avoid multiple
asylum applications lodged in several Member States
under different names by tracking down applicants who
have been refused asylum or who have been removed/
expelled from another Member State. The Eurodac system
is based on a separate convention and it is currently being
discussed but is far behind schedule.26 As with other
conventions it has to be first ratified by the Member
States, though it is proposed that the convention might
enter into force among the ratifying Member States
before all of them have completed the process of
ratification.
The entry into force of this convention will certainly
have an impact on the application of Dublin, as it will
facilitate the exchange and use of information in individual
cases foreseen in Art. 15 of the Dublin Convention. There
have been problems regarding the exchange of this
information and efforts are being made to improve the
quality of the exchange of information, by improving
storage of and access to such information in Member
States and by agreeing on principles of best practice in
this respect. Moreover, Eurodac permits that the identity
of the asylum seeker, and the EU Member State in which
they first arrived, can be confirmed. In the meantime, the
exchange of asylum seekers’ fingerprints is being carried
out on a bilateral basis according to national laws and
respecting EU principles on data protection.
In this respect lessons have to be drawn from the
application of Schengen and administrations should avoid
repeating the same mistakes. Although Schengen did not
foresee a computer system containing fingerprints or any
other data on asylum seekers, the storage and processing
of personal data in the Schengen Information System
(SIS) has resulted, in some cases, in preventing individuals
from lodging an asylum application in a Member State. In
at least two cases, such rejections have been condemned
in court.27 In these cases the courts did not oppose the
storage of data in the SIS (the registration as undesirable
aliens in another Member State was not related to the
asylum procedure), but the administrative procedure
(based on SIS information) which resulted in the refusal
of entry at the border even though the people in question
were at risk of persecution on return to their country of
origin.
Need for a flexible system of proof
It has already been mentioned that the Article 18
Committee has adopted decisions on the means of proof.28
These are the decisive means by which a Member State
decides whether or not to assume responsibility for
examining an asylum application. Experience with the
application of the Schengen Convention showed that
many requests to take charge were based exclusively on
the statement of the asylum seeker and were consequently
not accepted. As a result, the Schengen States adopted a
recommendation to accept, in individual cases, requests
based on the statement of the applicant provided that this
statement is consistent, sufficiently detailed and verifiable.
In the framework of Dublin, the Article 18 Committee
decisions on the means of proof states that responsibility
for examining the asylum application should be based on
as few requirements of proof as possible and that Member
States should accept responsibility on the basis of
indicative evidence. If the establishment of proof carried
excessive requirements, the procedure for determining
responsibility would ultimately take longer than the
examination of the actual application for asylum. In that
case, the Convention would fail to have the desired effect
since the delays would create a new category of refugees
in orbit, asylum seekers whose applications would not be
examined until the Dublin procedure had been completed.
In addition, under too rigid a system of proof the Member
States would not accept responsibility and the Convention
would be applied only in rare instances, while those
Member States with more extensive national registers
would be penalised since their responsibility could be
proved more easily.
Practice has shown that this problem is far from being
resolved. In March 1998, half a year after the entry into
force of the Dublin Convention, the Justice and Home
Affairs ministers acknowledged that the Convention did
not work, in particular because of the difficulties in
establishing the Member State through whose borders an
applicant entered the EU. In May, the Justice and Home
Affairs Council again discussed the issue of the assessment
criteria and Southern countries argued for decisions to be
based on serious and more reliable grounds.29 The
conclusion of the Eurodac convention and its application
will certainly contribute to solving this problem which is
still contentious among the Member States.6
Need to adjust time limits
The Dublin Convention includes provisions related to the
obligation to take charge of an applicant (and to transfer
or take him/her back and to reply to a request) within
certain time limits. If a Member State, where an application
for asylum has been lodged, considers that another
Member State is responsible for examining the application
it may, within six months, ask the other Member State to
take charge of the applicant. A delay of three months from
receipt in answering the request to take charge is provided
for.30 In the Schengen Convention there were no fixed
time limits, though the contracting states initially agreed
to exactly the same time limit. In practice this deadline
proved to be too long, as it did not prevent the
disappearance of applicants. Consequently, the Schengen
Executive Committee adopted two recommendations
which were: first, a time limit of, in principle, one month
to reply to a claim was fixed; and, second, for urgent
requests (e.g. refusal of entry) that the States shall try to
reply within the time limit set by the requesting State. The
Article 18 Committee has reduced the initial deadline of
three months to one month taking into account the
Schengen experience.31
After acceptance of the request to take charge, or take
back, the transfer of the applicant has to take place within
one month (Art. 11(5)) under Dublin. This time limit was
taken over by the Schengen States initially, but it seemed
it was impossible to comply with in practice in spite of the
efforts of the requesting State. For that reason the Schengen
Executive Committee decided that the requested State
remain responsible even if the time limit is not respected
when this is due to exceptional circumstances, such as
illness, pregnancy or criminal detention. Also in such
cases the States determine, by common agreement, the
time limit for each concrete case, even when the applicant
has disappeared. In practice, the Dublin authorities in
Member States have also applied the same principles, this
being another of the areas in which the Dublin authorities
have benefited from the previous Schengen experience.
Nevertheless, this is an issue which still raises some
problems in practice, and further guidelines on how to
tackle them should follow. Moreover, the time limits to
reply to a request for information on individual cases
have to be adjusted to permit greater speed in the exchange
of information.32
Treatment of members of the same family
One of the problems that the Dublin Convention faces
relates to the division of responsibility for examining the
asylum applications of members of the same family. A
problem particularly arises when  couples lodging an
application for asylum in the same country are separated
as a consequence of the application of the Dublin criteria
for the allocation of responsibility. A situation like this
may appear, for example, when members of the same
family are in possession of a visa issued by embassies of
different Member States, or where they have crossed
different external borders when entering EU territory in
an irregular manner. This is an undesirable situation that
also occurred in the application of the Schengen asylum
chapter.33
Within Art. 9 of Dublin a responsible State can
request that another State assume responsibility on
humanitarian grounds based on family and cultural
reasons, in so far as the person concerned so wishes.
There is, however, no guarantee that the requested State
will agree to the transfer of responsibility. In addition,
Art. 9 can be applied only at the request of another
Member State.
Hence, it has been argued that this article does not
establish an individual right for the asylum applicant
entitling him/her to have his/her application examined by
a given Member State, but merely refers to an
administrative possibility for contracting parties to arrange
for a transfer of responsibility.34 The asylum applicant
could only prevent Art. 9 being applied by not giving his/
her consent to the transfer, but could not claim the
application of this provision him/herself. However,
asylum applicants have successfully appealed in court
against such an administrative decision, by claiming a
right to have their application transferred on the basis of
Dublin Art. 9 and Schengen Art. 36.35
Another question relates to the scope of the application
of this humanitarian clause: to what types of family
reunion does it apply? In April 1997, the Schengen
Executive Committee adopted a Decision identifying
situations in which the humanitarian clause could be
applied. The Decision points out, that the clause can be
invoked in cases in which a family member is gravely ill,
has a serious handicap, is old, is pregnant or has a new-
born child, or where minors risk being separated and left
unattended. The Article 18 Committee also adopted, in
September 1998, a similar decision clarifying the
application of this humanitarian clause.
These decisions do not contemplate other situations
in which Dublin Art. 9 could be applied, for instance to
reunite family members who risk being separated from
one of their members who is already in possession of
humanitarian, temporary, or de facto, status and therefore
legally residing in a Member State; or couples who have
not concluded a legally valid marriage yet live in a long-
term relationship.36 Thus, the Article 18 Committee
could take further steps to apply this humanitarian clause
in a more generous manner.
Furthermore, in the framework of Dublin, it seems
also that in those cases the Member States could use the
right to examine an application submitted to it even if it
is not responsible under the criteria set out in the
Convention, provided that the asylum applicant agrees to
it. The opt-out clause, which we will mention next, can
therefore also apply for family reunification purposes.
Application of the opt-out clause
The Dublin Convention provides for an opt-out clause,37
which allows a State to examine an asylum application
submitted to it even though it is not responsible according
to the Convention.38 In the case of the Schengen
Agreement, the corresponding provision39 limited the
possible use of the clause to special circumstances,
particularly those derived from national legislation. This
is not the case with the Dublin Convention40 which could,
therefore, be applied in a wider sense. This opt-out clause7
has been applied for very different reasons and purposes:
sometimes in the interest of the applicant, for medical
(serious illness and pregnancy) and humanitarian reasons:
in other cases in order to accelerate the handling of an
application.41 Art. 3(4) stipulates that a Member State can
examine the application, provided that the applicant for
asylum agrees to this. The Schengen agreement did not
include such a provision, so in this respect Dublin is a
better instrument from an asylum seeker’s perspective.
However, it cannot be guaranteed that this rule of the
Dublin Convention is always applied in the best interest
of the asylum seeker only. Some EU Member States’
authorities consider that the mere fact of having lodged an
asylum application in a Member State indicates the
applicant’s agreement to the claim being processed in
that particular State.42
In other cases, it was applied to avoid the application
of the “safe third country” clause by the Member State
responsible for the examination of the application. Lower
Courts in the Netherlands obliged the administrative
authorities to apply this clause when the responsible
Member State according to the Dublin criteria would not
follow the general Dutch policy of not expelling a
particular groups of asylum seekers.
Also in other cases, the State may undertake to examine
the asylum application if, during the procedure of
determining which is the responsible Member State, it
has already examined the substance of the claim. In any
case, guidelines on its application should be provided as
suggested by the UNHCR.
Application in time
Another question that arises related to the application of
the Dublin Convention concerns “application in time”. In
the absence of any provisions setting its retroactive
application, Dublin is not (nor was Schengen) retroactively
applicable.43 However, the question remains, whether in
relation to the facts that determine the responsibility of a
country to examine an asylum application the same
understanding applies. That is whether only the facts
occurring after the entry into force of the Convention can
be taken into account or whether, conversely, facts
happening before that date can also be considered for the
allocation of responsibility. The Schengen States reached
a pragmatic consensus on the consideration of certain
facts relevant to the allocation of responsibility, even
though they may be antecedent to the entry into force of
the Convention. Those are: visas and residence permits
issued before the date of the entry into force of Schengen
but valid on and after that date; asylum proceedings
initiated but not concluded before the date of its entry into
force; the recognition of refugee status and permission
given to a family member of the applicant to reside is
relevant to the determination of the responsible Member
State even when this recognition was made prior to 26
March 1995. The Schengen States did not, however,
come to a common agreement regarding the allocation of
responsibility based on a previous rejection of a refugee
status made before 26 March 1995.
In respect to the Dublin Convention retroactive
application to asylum applications submitted before the
Convention entered into force is clearly excluded but it
does not provide any guidance regarding the retroactive
application of facts related to events which occurred
before its entry into force. However, it would hardly
make sense to exclude every fact, which may be relevant
for the application of the Dublin Convention from its
scope of application, because it already existed before 1
September 1997.44 Otherwise, as argued, Dublin would
only cover persons born after September 1997.45 For this
reason, the flexible implementation of the application of
time limits stipulated in the Convention is needed.
What are the limitations of the Convention?
Limited scope of the Convention
One of the shortcomings of the Dublin Convention lies in
the fact that it only contemplates asylum applicants that
seek protection under the Geneva Convention of 1951
from a Member State by claiming refugee status. It does
not include those persons who seek some kind of temporary
or humanitarian status according to national legislation
or other international conventions. It has also to be
noticed that the applicants frequently do not distinguish
clearly between political persecution, within the meaning
of Art. 1 of the Geneva Convention and other forms of
persecution, like inhuman treatment and torture or risks
of violence or civil war. They normally seek protection
on whatever grounds it might be granted. This limitation
is quite relevant specially when it has been recognised
that the number of these kinds of refugees looking for
temporary protection is considerable and has risen due to
the adoption of the restrictive asylum laws and policies.
Anyway, it is clear that Dublin is not applicable in cases
where any other form of protection is applied.46
Furthermore, it raises some problems concerning the
application of the Convention.
The Dublin experience has provided some cases in
which an asylum application is withdrawn and replaced
by a claim for temporary protection. In these cases does
the Convention still apply and should the transfer to the
competent State take place?  If an asylum applicant
withdraws a claim Dublin becomes in principle
inapplicable. The Legal Service of the Council gave its
opinion of the application of the Dublin Convention in
these cases and pointed out that the aim of the Convention
is to determine the State responsible for examining
applications for asylum.47 Thus, it can be assumed that the
provisions of the Convention do not apply where an
application has been withdrawn, because there is no need
to determine the State responsible for examining an
application that no longer exists.48 It must therefore be
concluded that the provisions of the Dublin Convention
do not apply in cases where asylum applications are
withdrawn, apart from the two cases covered by the Art.
3(7)49 and Art. 10(1)(d),50 when the applicant lodges a
new application in another Member State. Although the
Convention applies solely to asylum applicants and not to
persons seeking other kinds of protection, there is one
exceptional case in which the Convention applies to
persons who are not asylum applicants. This is the case of
Art. 10(1)(e), which provides that the State responsible8
must take back “an alien whose application it has rejected
and who is illegally in another Member State”. But that is
only the logical consequence of the rejection of the
application.51 From a legal point of view this provision
cannot be used as an argument to extend the scope of the
Convention. This does not provide any guidance regarding
situations in which, before the withdrawal of the asylum
application, another Member State has given a positive
reply to a request to take over or to take back the applicant.52
There is neither a clear solution to cases in which the
transfer has taken place before the withdrawal. Therefore
guidelines regarding the application of the Convention to
asylum applicants who withdraw their claim should be
agreed upon.
Lack of substantive and procedural harmonisation
This has been pointed out as one of the most serious
issues raised by the Convention. As we mentioned above
the responsible Member State is due to examine the
asylum application in accordance with its national law
and international obligations. As the national legislations
of the Member States are not harmonised, this agreement
presupposes mutual confidence in each other’s legislation
and adjudication processes, which relies on the fact that
there is a common framework to the different national
laws constituted by the Geneva Convention as amended
by the New York Protocol. Indeed, it has been
acknowledged that although all Member States apply the
same international rules regarding refugees very important
divergences persist among them (e.g. agent of persecution,
competent authorities, appeal rights). In the absence of
harmonisation, the probability of success of a claim
varies from Member State to Member State. Applicants
seek to apply to the most liberal State which in turn cannot
maintain the standards for very long. This situation will
eventually result in an undesirable de facto harmonisation
according to the lowest standard.
It is true that some progress has been achieved in this
respect since the signature of the Dublin Convention.
Harmonisation efforts regarding asylum procedural rules
were crowned by the adoption of the resolution on
manifestly unfounded asylum applications; the resolution
on a harmonised approach to questions concerning host
third countries; conclusions on countries in which there
is generally no serious risk of persecution53 and also the
resolution on the minimum guarantees for asylum
procedures.54 With respect to the harmonisation of
substantive law an important breakthrough was achieved
by the adoption in March 1996 of a Common Position on
the notion of “refugee”. More recently, in May 1998, the
Council adopted two joint actions concerning the financing
of specific projects to assist displaced persons, asylum
seekers and refugees, which is a first small step to
bringing reception and integration facilities and practices
in the EU Member States closer. Most of these instruments
are, however, not legally binding and therefore do not
guarantee a substantive or procedural equivalence of the
asylum decisions in all the Member States. The
Amsterdam Treaty introduced some improvements
regarding cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home
Affairs and it allows room for expectations towards faster
progress regarding harmonisation of asylum policies and
procedures. Asylum, as well as other policies related to
the free movement of persons, has been transferred to the
First Pillar and the measures to be adopted in this field
have been listed in Art. 63 of the TEC, which also states
a deadline of five years for its implementation.
Safe third country
The Preamble of the Dublin Convention states that it
provides a guarantee for all asylum applicants that their
applications will be examined by one of the Member
States.55 This is not, however, the case as each Member
State retains the right to send the applicant to a third State.
The Dublin Convention56 allows any Member State to
send an applicant for asylum to a third State, once a
Member State has been assigned the responsibility to
process an asylum claim. This possibility has been heavily
criticised due to the absence of explicit stated requirements
for the Member States to inquire into the conditions in the
third country before sending the applicant there. Human
rights and other pressure groups have expressed the
concern with this situation, which might undermine the
objective of reducing the number of refugees in orbit and
lead involuntarily to the refoulement of an asylum seeker.
In combination with the increasing number of readmission
agreements signed, this concept represents an attempt to
create a buffer zone around Western Europe. This might
be a legitimate way of stimulating the creation of reliable
systems for refugee protection, which are also financed
by the agreements, in neighbouring countries, namely in
Central and Eastern Europe. However, it should not be a
way for Western Europe to neglect its role in ensuring
refugee protection.
In this respect there are court cases, in which asylum
seekers have appealed against a transfer decision arguing
that the EU Member State responsible for processing
their asylum case, would return them to a third country,
from where they would risk being sent back to their
country of origin and subjected to persecution. Avoiding
such persecution being the original reason why applicants
sought asylum in a certain Member State. The possibility
of appealing against the transfer is not based on the
Dublin Convention but on national law, and thus it is not
available in all of the Member States. Just to give one
example, according to the Finnish Aliens’ Act,
applications for asylum are considered manifestly
unfounded and are not subject to appeal, if the applicant
can be sent to another State which is responsible for
examining the application according to the Dublin
Convention.57
It has been argued that the possibility of appealing
against being transferred to the responsible Member
State should be granted to asylum seekers, and that the
appeal should have a suspensive effect. However, this
would not be compatible with the principle that the
Dublin Convention is based on mutual trust in Member
States’ asylum procedures. Therefore, the solution should
be found in a common approach by the European Union
Member States towards safe third countries. The
harmonised application of the “safe third country” notion,
expressed in the 1992 London resolution, is already a step9
in that direction. In Paragraph 3(a) it indicates that the
Member State in which asylum has been submitted is to
examine whether or not the principle of the third country
can be applied. The procedures for sending the applicant
to the host third country are to be set in motion before
considering whether or not to transfer responsibility to
another Member State pursuant to the Dublin Convention.
This option would, however, create a risk of the passport
control authorities in some Member States proceeding to
make arrangements for the return of the applicant to a
third country before considering the criteria of the Dublin
Convention (e.g. Art. 4, the applicant having a family
member who is a recognised refugee in another Member
State).58 This particular problem does not appear in Finland
because, according to the Finnish Aliens’ Act (Art. 39),
whenever an alien applies for asylum in Finland the
decision on refusal of entry is always made, not by the
passport control authorities, but, by the Directorate of
Immigration, i.e. the same authority which is responsible
for processing the asylum application and the procedures
pursuant to the Dublin Convention. In this context, the
relevant Dublin elements of the application are to be
processed first in Finland.
In any case Western Europe should preserve its
commitment to granting protection and reaffirm its role
and responsibility as regards the refugee problem. The
removal to a third host country should only take place if
it has been established that the receiving country will
indeed admit the asylum seeker, will observe the principle
of non-refoulement and will consider the claim. It should
be noted that the Dublin Convention stipulates that the
processing of an asylum application by the responsible
State should be undertaken in accordance with its
obligations under the 1951 Convention.59
Judicial control
As with Schengen, the Dublin Convention excludes the
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to ensure uniform
interpretation and application of its provisions and to
resolve any differences arising between Member States
or between individuals and national authorities. The
Article 18 Committee (Art. 18) is charged with examining
any question regarding the application or interpretation
of the Convention at the request of one or more Member
States. The Decisions and actions of this Article 18
Committee are also not subject to judicial control by the
Court of justice, even though the operative decisions
adopted by it  may indirectly affect the rights of an
individual.
A question also arises about the direct applicability of
the Dublin Convention; whether the Dublin Convention
does in itself establish individual rights. The Council
Secretariat, as mentioned previously has looked at this
issue at the request of the Austrian delegation which
stated that the Convention is addressed to Member States,
i.e. it lays down a procedure between Member States to
which the asylum applicant is not a party. Therefore,
although the applicant’s interests and special links with a
particular Member State might be taken into account, no
provision entitles an asylum applicant to have his/her
application examined by a particular Member State, not
even Arts. 3(4) and 9 requiring the asylum applicant’s
agreement to apply certain criteria.60 Individuals may
appeal against a transfer decision according to national
laws.61 However, this possibility of resorting to the national
courts, if the possibility is granted by national law (and
we have already mentioned cases in which this possibility
is granted, in contrast with others when it is not), does not
promote uniformity or consistency in the interpretation
and application of these provisions.
In the future this situation will change in view of the
replacement of the Dublin Convention by a Community
instrument as a result of the implementation of the
Amsterdam Treaty. This is a necessary and welcome
development from the perspective of asylum seekers and
refugees but also from the point of view of the
administrations in charge, which can rely on a uniform
application and interpretation of the instrument in contrast
with the enforcement resulting from national case law.
PROBLEMS AND LIMITATIONS
• Completion and development of implementation
measures
• Limited scope of the Convention
• Lack of material and procedural harmonisation
• Safe third country
• Judicial control
Conclusions
Though the impact of the Dublin Convention on the
refugee problem is not crucial62 its importance should not
be underestimated. As one can observe from the graphs at
the end of this article Dublin does not apply to the vast
majority of asylum claims although this statistical data
shows that the number is increasing. Nevertheless, it is
the first binding instrument in force in the European
Union in the field of asylum, confirming the Member
States’ will to ensure protection for those in need, by
sharing the responsibility of examining an asylum
application. After being applied for one year, it is quite
hard to draw conclusions on its application or on the
question of whether it has fulfilled its aims.
Further comparative study is needed on its
implementation by the various Member States’
administrations and enforcement by national courts. One
can, however, attempt to point out the positive aspects of
the Convention for the protection of the asylum seekers
and also for the administrations in charge of asylum
procedures, as well as the negative points.
The Convention is an important instrument for the
Member States’ authorities in processing asylum
applications, by providing legal prerequisites for the
exchange of information about applicants. In this respect
it certainly contributes to fighting abuses of asylum
procedures and situations of multiple asylum applications,
even in a preventive way. Moreover, it has established
practical cooperation between the administrations in
charge and permits an increase in knowledge of others’
asylum procedures. The Convention has also brought to
light the differences between Member States’ policies,
procedures and standards which need to be tackled in the
future, not only for the sake of the smooth application of10
the Convention itself, but, in order to provide the EU with
its own answers and strategies to the asylum dilemma.
From the perspective of asylum seekers, the
application of the Convention is a challenge both for
practitioners and decision-makers as it leaves the door
open to a more restrictive or, conversely, a more generous
application. In practice, the application by the various
Member States differs. Much depends on how it is tackled
in practice: for example, concerning the issue of claims of
members of the same family or how the concept of the
third safe state is applied. Both questions have been
handled differently by the Member States. In this respect
the timing of the entry into force was important and the
climate might even have been somewhat more favourable
than in previous years of crisis.
The decrease in the number of asylum claims in
almost all European Union Member States does not
exclude having goals for hastening asylum applications.
In addition, delays and backlogs should be reduced,
rejected applicants should be sent back to their home
country and abuse should be deterred. These important
goals are, however, secondary to the real objectives of
asylum, which are to provide protection to the persecuted,
to grant asylum seekers an individual examination of
their claim, to achieve procedural fairness and to meet
humanitarian concerns. We can only hope that these
concerns will be reflected in the future development of
instruments, guidelines of interpretation and applications,
which will ensure an efficient and common approach in
the application of the Convention. Some limitations of
the Convention will be overcome in the long term. It is
still not known when, although a time limit was set by the
Amsterdam Treaty, and to what extent the European
Court of Justice will be granted jurisdiction regarding the
interpretation of disputes arising from the application of
the Dublin Convention. The development of binding
instruments at the level of the European Union to
harmonise procedural and substantive asylum rules has a
long way to go, although an important breakthrough was
achieved in Amsterdam. Furthermore, a comprehensive
European Union strategy in the field of asylum is based
on an ideal solution of fighting the root causes. As the
Commission suggests in its Communication, true
solidarity and burden sharing between the Member States
and objective public information will take time to emerge.
The Dublin Convention’s entry into force, with all its
limitations and problems was a welcome first step on the
long path the European Union has to take to develop its
refugee strategy. This strategy will, as stated by the High
Commissioner for Refugees, “reaffirm Europe’s
leadership and solidarity with the global refugee problem”.
RÉSUMÉ
La Convention de Dublin sur l’asile, conclue en 1990
entre 12 Etats membres et à laquelle les nouveaux Etats
membres, l’Autriche, la Finlande et la Suède étaient
tenus d’adhérer au moment de leur adhésion à l’UE, est
entrée en vigueur le 1er septembre 1997.  Cette convention
fut conçue à une époque de très forte augmentation des
demandes d’asile afin de réduire les longs délais dans les
procédures de traitement des demandes d’asile et d’éviter
de gaspiller les ressources des Etats membres à cause
d’une redondance d’efforts. En outre, elle se voulait une
réponse coordonnée aux situations des réfugiés “en
orbite” et aux demandes d’asile multiples, qui étaient
facilitées par la création du marché intérieur. Dès lors,
la Convention de Dublin fixe des critères communs afin
de déterminer l’Etat membre qui sera responsable de
l’examen d’une demande d’asile. Elle ne visait pas à
harmoniser les règles de procédure ou de fond en matière
d’asile dans les Etats membres. La Convention de Dublin
contient six critères de base classés par ordre
hiérarchique, ainsi que des modifications et exceptions
qui servent à identifier l’Etat qui sera chargé de l’examen.
Ces critères sont les suivants : regroupement familial,
visa ou permis de résidence en cours de validité délivré
par un Etat membre déterminé, franchissement irrégulier
de la frontière d’un Etat membre, responsabilité du
contrôle à l’entrée et Etat membre dans lequel la demande
est introduite en premier lieu. L’Etat qui est responsable
selon les critères de la Convention, examine la demande
en vertu de ses lois nationales et de la Convention de
Genève de 1951 et son Protocole de 1967. L’Etat membre
responsable a l’obligation de conduire la procédure à
terme jusqu’à ce qu’une décision définitive ait été rendue
et des dispositions sont prévues pour réadmettre le
demandeur d’asile dans l’Etat membre responsable s’il
se trouve sur le territoire d’un autre Etat membre.
Bien que la Convention de Dublin n’ait pas un impact
vital sur le problème des réfugiés, il ne faut cependant
pas sous-estimer son importance. Il s’agit en effet du
premier instrument contraignant en vigueur dans l’Union
européenne dans le domaine de l’asile, confirmant ainsi
la volonté des Etats membres d’assurer la protection des
personnes concernées au moyen d’un partage de la
responsabilité du traitement de la demande d’asile. Un
an à peine après son entrée en vigueur, il est difficile de
tirer des conclusions sur ses applications ou de répondre
à la question de savoir si elle a atteint ses objectifs. Il
faudrait pour cela une étude comparative approfondie
sur sa mise en oeuvre par les différentes administrations
des Etats membres et sur son interprétation et son contrôle
par les juridictions nationales. On peut, toutefois, tenter
de déceler les problèmes d’application et les limites de la
Convention, en mettant en évidence les autres instruments
et lignes de conduite en matière d’interprétation et
d’application qui sont nécessaires pour en améliorer le
fonctionnement.
La Convention représente un important instrument
au service des autorités des Etats membres pour instruire
les demandes d’asile, dès lors qu’elle pose le cadre
juridique requis pour un échange d’informations sur les
demandeurs d’asile et, sous cet angle, elle contribue
certainement à lutter contre les abus en matière de
procédure d’asile ainsi que contre les situations de
demandes multiples, et ce même à titre préventif. En
outre, elle instaure une coopération pratique entre les
administrations compétentes et permet d’accroître les
connaissances des procédures d’asile de chacun. Du
point de vue de la protection des demandeurs d’asile, la
Convention laisse une certaine marge de manoeuvre, du11
moins pour l’instant, pour une application plus généreuse
ou plus restrictive, selon le cas, et l’on rencontre dans la
pratique des exemples de ces deux approches. La
Convention a aussi mis au jour les différences entre les
politiques, les procédures et normes des Etats membres
qu’il faudra résoudre à l’avenir, non seulement pour une
application harmonieuse de la Convention, mais aussi
pour tenter d’esquisser les réponses et stratégies de
l’Union européenne face au dilemme de l’asile.
________________
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59 It has been argued that the Geneva Convention is violated if
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a third State, which may not provide sufficient access to
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61 Art. 11(5).
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